The Coefficients of Egoism or how Altruism is important until it affects my Political majority (Climate change mitigation)
A round of climate change talks under the auspices of the United Nations framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) concluded in Austria today with agreement on key elements for an effective international response to climate change.
“Countries have been able to reassess the big picture of what is needed by identifying the key building blocks for an effective response to climate change,” said UNFCCC Executive Secretary Yvo de Boer. “There is a consensus that the response needs to be global, with the involvement of all countries and that it needs to give equal importance to adaptation and mitigation.”
Government delegates also debated how the response can be enabled by an approach
that opens the way for financial flows to climate-friendly and climate-proof investments. This was based on a report on the investment and financial flows relevant to the development of an effective and appropriate international response to climate change, presented to the conference by the UN Climate Change Secretariat.
“The report clearly shows that energy efficiency can achieve real emission reductions at low cost,” said Yvo de Boer. “It also shows that many cost-effective opportunities for reducing emissions are in developing countries, but also that industrialised countries need aggressive emission reduction strategies”, he said, alluding to the potential of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM permits industrialized countries to invest in sustainable development projects and thereby generate tradable emission credits.
One of the primary reasons for the failure of the Kyoto protocol was the inadequacy in the beginning for the countries (actors) agreeing upon ``fair play'' principles, (a priori) in accordance to an equilibrium strategy. Quantative and qualitative attributes for the Kp were not ascertained prior but after the initial agreement ,meaning ratification of the KP was politically untenable for the US and others and as was seen in the 95-0 in the US Senate for emission and energy reforms under the Clinton/gore administration.
The St Petersberg school of game theory showed that this would be the outcome in the late 1990’s .
The late Yuri. M. Svirezhev, W. von Bloh, and H.-J. Schellnhuber showed the application of the “emission game” to Co2 perturbations that agreement and cooperation was a priori to an ESS(evolutionary stable strategy) in a NON-ANTAGONISTIC game.
If there are no doubts that we must reduce the total emission of carbon dioxide then the problem of how much different countries should be allowed to contribute to this amount remains a serious one. We suggest this problem to be considered as a non-antagonistic game (in Germeier's sense). A game of this kind is called an ``emission'' game. Suppose that there are n independent actors (countries or regions), each of them releasing a certain amount of CO per year (in carbon units)into the atmosphere, and that the emission would be reduced by each actor. Each actor has his own aim: to minimise the loss in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) caused by the reduction of emissions. On the other hand, taking into account that it is impossible to estimate more or less precisely the impact of the climate change on GDP for each country today, a common strategy will be to reduce the climate change. Since one of the main leading factors in global warming is the greenhouse effect, then the common aim will be to reduce the sum of emissions. This is a typical conflict situation. How to resolve it? We can weigh the ``egoistic'' and ``altruistic'' criteria for each actor introducing so-called ``coefficients of egoism''. This coefficient is very large, if the actor uses a very egoistic strategy, and conversely, if the actor is a ``super-altruist'', then the corresponding coefficient is very small. Using these coefficients we get the general solution of the game in a form of some Pareto's equilibrium. The solution is stable and efficient.
So what are ‘tenable solutions for the “problem’ perceived or otherwise As we analyzed here A Paradigm shift in Policy mechanisms for Energy Security from the G8 will produce more realistic outcomes then Kyoto. Part 2
As we previously suggested in our first report on the likely outcome of the G8 Gleneagles communiqué on Climate change, the communiqué has provided a consensus on additional strategic pathways for implementing the primary goal of stabilizing anthropogenic GHG emissions.
This multi faceted approach has brought consensus on outcomes, and will allow a global set of mechanisms that will introduce improvements to energy efficiency, renewable energy, cleaner energy systems, new technology and the transfer of technology to developing countries whilst maintaining global growth.
It also introduces a number of mechanisms for the low cost introduction of cleaner renewable energy systems for developing countries that will help to provide growth and allow them to bypass the use of carbon based energy systems.
The primary goals that were identified by the communiqué were
1 Transforming the way we uses energy
2 Powering a cleaner future
3 Promoting research and development
4 Financing the transition to cleaner energy
5 Managing the impact of climate change
6 Tackling illegal logging
7 Lower cost energy
These have signified a change from one of tariff based emission reduction to a broader role of technology and the delivery mechanisms of energy. This will create substantial opportunities in the areas of scientific research, engineering technology especially micro measurement, electrical efficiency and fuel technology.
What the G8 initatives will do,is to implement transparency of the energy complex,identify areas of cooperation in energy resource management and transfer.Provide structure for the efficient and economic transfer of technology to the worlds poorest countries to enable development and independence,This will also enable those countries to bypass the carbon cycle where possible and to enable positive economic growth and improved standards for education,health,and infrastructure.The initiatives will enable existing economic growth .
Therefore the simplest solution is the transfer of technology at low cost to the poorest countries instead of “financial largesse’ which has not worked over the last 50 years,This can include agriculture technology to enhance food output.
A win/win outcome.
A round of climate change talks under the auspices of the United Nations framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) concluded in Austria today with agreement on key elements for an effective international response to climate change.
“Countries have been able to reassess the big picture of what is needed by identifying the key building blocks for an effective response to climate change,” said UNFCCC Executive Secretary Yvo de Boer. “There is a consensus that the response needs to be global, with the involvement of all countries and that it needs to give equal importance to adaptation and mitigation.”
Government delegates also debated how the response can be enabled by an approach
that opens the way for financial flows to climate-friendly and climate-proof investments. This was based on a report on the investment and financial flows relevant to the development of an effective and appropriate international response to climate change, presented to the conference by the UN Climate Change Secretariat.
“The report clearly shows that energy efficiency can achieve real emission reductions at low cost,” said Yvo de Boer. “It also shows that many cost-effective opportunities for reducing emissions are in developing countries, but also that industrialised countries need aggressive emission reduction strategies”, he said, alluding to the potential of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM permits industrialized countries to invest in sustainable development projects and thereby generate tradable emission credits.
One of the primary reasons for the failure of the Kyoto protocol was the inadequacy in the beginning for the countries (actors) agreeing upon ``fair play'' principles, (a priori) in accordance to an equilibrium strategy. Quantative and qualitative attributes for the Kp were not ascertained prior but after the initial agreement ,meaning ratification of the KP was politically untenable for the US and others and as was seen in the 95-0 in the US Senate for emission and energy reforms under the Clinton/gore administration.
The St Petersberg school of game theory showed that this would be the outcome in the late 1990’s .
The late Yuri. M. Svirezhev, W. von Bloh, and H.-J. Schellnhuber showed the application of the “emission game” to Co2 perturbations that agreement and cooperation was a priori to an ESS(evolutionary stable strategy) in a NON-ANTAGONISTIC game.
If there are no doubts that we must reduce the total emission of carbon dioxide then the problem of how much different countries should be allowed to contribute to this amount remains a serious one. We suggest this problem to be considered as a non-antagonistic game (in Germeier's sense). A game of this kind is called an ``emission'' game. Suppose that there are n independent actors (countries or regions), each of them releasing a certain amount of CO per year (in carbon units)into the atmosphere, and that the emission would be reduced by each actor. Each actor has his own aim: to minimise the loss in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) caused by the reduction of emissions. On the other hand, taking into account that it is impossible to estimate more or less precisely the impact of the climate change on GDP for each country today, a common strategy will be to reduce the climate change. Since one of the main leading factors in global warming is the greenhouse effect, then the common aim will be to reduce the sum of emissions. This is a typical conflict situation. How to resolve it? We can weigh the ``egoistic'' and ``altruistic'' criteria for each actor introducing so-called ``coefficients of egoism''. This coefficient is very large, if the actor uses a very egoistic strategy, and conversely, if the actor is a ``super-altruist'', then the corresponding coefficient is very small. Using these coefficients we get the general solution of the game in a form of some Pareto's equilibrium. The solution is stable and efficient.
So what are ‘tenable solutions for the “problem’ perceived or otherwise As we analyzed here A Paradigm shift in Policy mechanisms for Energy Security from the G8 will produce more realistic outcomes then Kyoto. Part 2
As we previously suggested in our first report on the likely outcome of the G8 Gleneagles communiqué on Climate change, the communiqué has provided a consensus on additional strategic pathways for implementing the primary goal of stabilizing anthropogenic GHG emissions.
This multi faceted approach has brought consensus on outcomes, and will allow a global set of mechanisms that will introduce improvements to energy efficiency, renewable energy, cleaner energy systems, new technology and the transfer of technology to developing countries whilst maintaining global growth.
It also introduces a number of mechanisms for the low cost introduction of cleaner renewable energy systems for developing countries that will help to provide growth and allow them to bypass the use of carbon based energy systems.
The primary goals that were identified by the communiqué were
1 Transforming the way we uses energy
2 Powering a cleaner future
3 Promoting research and development
4 Financing the transition to cleaner energy
5 Managing the impact of climate change
6 Tackling illegal logging
7 Lower cost energy
These have signified a change from one of tariff based emission reduction to a broader role of technology and the delivery mechanisms of energy. This will create substantial opportunities in the areas of scientific research, engineering technology especially micro measurement, electrical efficiency and fuel technology.
What the G8 initatives will do,is to implement transparency of the energy complex,identify areas of cooperation in energy resource management and transfer.Provide structure for the efficient and economic transfer of technology to the worlds poorest countries to enable development and independence,This will also enable those countries to bypass the carbon cycle where possible and to enable positive economic growth and improved standards for education,health,and infrastructure.The initiatives will enable existing economic growth .
Therefore the simplest solution is the transfer of technology at low cost to the poorest countries instead of “financial largesse’ which has not worked over the last 50 years,This can include agriculture technology to enhance food output.
A win/win outcome.
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